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Introduction 
Present-day thought outside Scholastic circles is in the 
main an idolatry of the positive sciences and of the scientif-
ic method. This scientism, with its claim for reason and sci-
ence of the power to explain everytning, has generated the 
anti-intellectualism which constitutes the outstanding trait 
of modern thought. 
The root cause of all the confusion and aberrations of 
the modern mind is undoubtedly ignorance of the true nature of 
the intellect. All the anti-intellectualist tirades are 
directed not against the true intellect, but against a dis-
tortion of it by positivistic thinkers and against an exagger-
ated reason. This is evident from even a cursory reading of 
the works of contemporary philosophers and scientists. Pro-
fessor J.B.S.Haldane is a typical example. Sceptic, scoffer 
at religious dogma and practice, and positivist of the deepest 
dye, he castigates St. Thomas and his fellow Scholastics for 
their "faulty logic, bad science, and bad mathematics." Ignor-
ing entirely the metaphysics of Thomistic philosophy, he 
rejects the proofs for the existence of God, concluding that 
God's existence cannot be known by human reason. 
Professor Haldane may be considered to stand for a large 
school of modern philosophic thought outside Scholasticism. 
His attacks on the ~uinque Viae of St. Thomas Aquinas are 
single examples o~ the present-day depreciation o~ the 
capability o~ the human reason to attain to truth. In this 
light, then, the author o~ this thesis has considered his 
subject. This will explain the brief introductory cbe.pters 
to the particular point 11nder discussion, namely, the argu-
ment ~rom motion for the existence of God. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
Modern Contempt for ~ Theistic Arguments 
It is a Catholic doctrine that the existence of 
God can be rationally proved. Few of your other be-
liefs are harder to swallow ••• But even if I believed 
in your God I should find it extraordinarily diffi-
cult to believe that my faith could be rationally 
grounded.l 
Such is the way that Professor J.B.S.Haldane introduces 
the reader of Science and the Supernatural to the traditional 
~uinque Viae of St. Thomas Aquinas. In an exchange of letters 
with the noted English convert to Catholicism, Arnold Lunn, 
Professor Hladane showers blow after blow on every spot of the 
body of catholic teaching and dogma. Because of his eminent 
position in British scientific circles he receives a wide 
hearing, even though the arguments he advances and the attacks 
he launches are echoes of a century of agnosticism and anti-
intellectualism. In fact, the name Haldane may very well 
stand as a generic one for that period, a period that has tria 
to show the incompati~ility of science and religion, has 
belittled and even denied the power of the human intelJ.e ct to 
attain to truth, and bas scoffed at God and everything con-
nected with Him. 
That the theistic proofs should share in the contempt 
which is being heaped upon reason is easily intelligible. In 
these arguments the mind makes its highest flights, soaring 
aloft to the invisible throne of Him Who makes Himself known 
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by the things that are made. Though respecting the antiquity 
of the traditional ar~ments for God's existence, contemporary 
uhilosophers outside Scholasticism are almost unanimous in 
"' 
proclaiming their inability to demonstrate God's existence. 
The ancient arguments for His (God's} existence 
are more or less discredited; it is agreed that 
demonstration of God is impossible.2 
In recent years theologians were inclined to 
agree so far that rational arguments could not 
establish the existence of God.3 
There is a consensus of opinion that the 
arguments are not valid in their present form ••• As 
proofs they break down. They suggest probabilities, 
probabilities of more or less degree, but they carry 
no conviction to the minds of those who demand 
cogent logic. 4 
They have their use, these venerable friends, 
but it is not that of a logical proof of the Divine 
existence. They are all attempts (each in its own 
way) to fill in with content and make definite to 
ourselves the conception of God, Whose existence is 
already supposed.5 --
What He (God) is in Himself and what He is in 
His relations to the gre~t universal phenomena, that 
is matter of hypothesis. 
Similar quotations from the works of contemporary philo-
sophers could be multiplied. The reasons for this almost 
universal prejudice against the theistic arguments are not 
difficult to find. 
It has been said that Kant and Hume by their destructive 
criticism of the theistic proofs once and for all exposed the 
fallacies underlying the traditional arguments for God's 
existence. Kant apodictically states that from the facts of 
nature no inference of God is justified, that philosophy took 
over the idea of God from the concrete religious thought of the 
past and tried to establish the truth of the divinity by means 
of abstract logical processes. His conclusion is that the 
human mind is incapable of finding final proof for God's 
existence. But, how little Kant was acquainted with the 
proofs set forth by St. Thomas and almost universally followed 
by Scholastics, is seen from his inclusion of the ontological 
argument among the theistic proofs. He gives a good deal of 
space to its refutation on the score that it involves the 
metaphysical fallacy of hypostatizing an idea.7 We cannot 
find fault with him there, though we do blame him for throwing 
dust in the eyes of succeeding generations who prefer his 
version of Thomistic theism to that of the original. That many 
philosophers followed Kant blindly in this is seen from a 
quotation from William James: 
The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have 
felt entitled either to scout or to neglect them, 
shows that they are not solid enough to serve as 
religion's all-sufficient foundation ••• not only do 
post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch, 
but it is a plain historic fact that they have never 
converted anyone.S 
Many of the moderns are of the opinion that the theistic 
arguments are inextricably bound up with Aristotelian and 
medieval science. Haldane takes this for granted, as we shall 
see. With the destruction of Aristotelian physics goes the 
necessary rejection of the arguments for God's existence. 
The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us the.t Aris-
totle's thought was enmeshed in the details o-r an 
erroneous physics and an erroneous cosmology ••• To-
day we repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the 
Aristotelian cosmology, so that the ~xact form of 
the above argument manifestly fails. 
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The theistic arguments are said to imply philosophical and 
scientific conceptions that have lost their meaning and been 
superseded. Since they depend on principles and mental methods 
now abandoned, they must be wholly recast, cr., preferably, 
abandoned altogether.lO 
Another preoccupation of modern philosophers is the his-
tory of religions and the evolutionary hypothesis, whereby they 
attempt to reach conclusions prejudicial to the theistic 
arguments. The history of religions, they contend, proves that 
theism evolved from polytheism, and that belief in God is 
independent of the traddtional theistic arguments. Moreover, 
by the time the Scholastics came on the philosophic stage, the 
idea of thei.sm had fully evolved, so that, ignorant of past 
history, they thought that the concept of One God was a primi-
tive and permanent possession of the human consciousness. very 
recent research among the primitive peoples of Africa and Asia 
have demonstrated the falsity of the evolution process, and tha 
all peoples have, in some guise or other, an idea of the One 
God. 
The exponents of anthropocentric philosophies reject the 
theistic arguments because the God they prove can be of no 
value or service to us. The Deists denied Divine Providence, 
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asserting that God was so far above this world that He had no 
concern for it. The humanitarians want comradeship, warmth 
and blessedness, for which the "bloodless categories of philo-
sophic thought" can never satisfy these vital needs.ll 
The vast literature of proofs for God's exis-
tence, drawn from the or.der of nature, which a cen-
tury ago seemed so overwhelmingly convincing, today 
does little more than gather dust in libraries, for 
the simple reason that our generation has ceased to 
believe in the kind of God it argued for ••• candidly 
speaking, how do such qualities as these {God's 
attributes) make any definite connection with our 
life? And if they severally call for no distinctive 
adaptations of our conduct, what vital difference 
can it possibly make to a man 1 s religion whether they 
be true or false?l2 
Deus est ens, a se, extra et supra omne genus ••• 
where~s-sucn-a definition reilly instr~ctive? It 
means less than nothing, in its pompous role of 
adjectives.l3 
All these prejudices against the traditional arguments for 
the existence of God have a root cause. It is the disregard of 
and positive contempt for the intelligence. If we deny to man 
this noble faculty, we deny its commensurateness with being, 
the spontaneous and necessary principles that flow from being, 
and condemn him to the absurdities and errors that characterize 
modern thought. Sense-perception, pure empiricism, nominalism 
and agnosticism are the logical outcome. For instance, the 
empirics deny that the principle of causality is a necessary 
truth, and that this principle e~nbles us to get away from the 
order of phenomena in order to ascend to the first cause. Hume 
in reality denied intelligence, or at least reduced it to the 
senses. 
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All our general ideas are in reality but par-
ticular ideas to which a common ter.m is assigned, 
and this latter occasionally recalls other particula 
ideas which correspond in certain respects to the 
idea that the mind actually has.l4 
This is the essence of empiric nominalism. John Stuart 
Mill held almost the same views, though he plunged even deep-
er into empiricism. 
What proof have we that only the intellectual 
can produce that which is intellectual? Have we 
any other means but experience for knowing what 
thing produces another of its kind, what causes 
are capable of producing certain effects? ••• Apart 
from experience and especially for what goes by 
the name of reason, which is concerned with the 
self-evident, it seems that no cause can produce 
an effect of a higher order than itself. But this 
conclusion is entirely different from anything 
we know about nature ••• The purpose of all the 
researches of modern science is to convince us 
completely that the higher forms of life are evolv-
ed from the lower, and that the more elaborate and 
superior ~Sganization in life must yield to the 
inferior. 
Through his empirical principles Mill is led to admit 
that there are no convincing proofs for theism. Through his 
nominalism he holds that the imagination affords us glimpses 
of a God Who exists, and that it is not unreasonable for 
anyone to hope that God exists provided he recognizes that 
there are no proofs. 
Herbert Spencer did not go as far as Mill in his form of 
nominalism. He accepts the existence of an external world, 
but considers the "so-called" principle of causality as the 
result of a habit which men have formed by having witnessed 
the constant succession of the same phenomena. His agnosti-
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cism is the logical outcome of his nominalism. 
It is impossible to avoid making the assump-
tion of self-existence somewhere; and whether that 
assumption be made nakedly (Theism) or under com-
plete disguises (Pantheism, Atheism), it is equally 
vicious, equally unthinkable ••• we find ourselves ·-
obliged to make certain assumptions; and yet we 
find these assumptions cannot be represented in 
thought. We are obliged to conclude that a first 
cause, infinite, absolute or independent, does 
exist; however, the materials of which the arguments 
are built, equally with the conclusions based on 
them, are merely s~bolic conceptions of the 
illegitimate order.l6 
Kantian empiricism and idealism are but two phases of 
agnosticism. The general principle of agnosticism is nothing 
else but phenomenalism. Human reason can have knowledge only 
of phenomena and of the laws by which they are governed. Our 
ideas have no ontological value--we can form no concept of 
the substantial being. Likewise, they have no transcendental 
value--they do not permit us to know God, the transcendental 
Being, supposing He really exists. Substance is simply a 
collection of phenomena, and causality a succession of pheno-
mena that cannot be said really to have been produced. Per-
sonality is nothing else but a sequence of interior phenomena 
mysteriously grouped together by our consciousness of them. 
Reason can have knowledge only of phenomena, because between 
it and the senses there is no essential difference.l7 
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CHAPTER II 
J.B.S.Haldane and His Philosophical Inheritance 
The introductory chapter to this thesis has been far 
from unnecessary. An examination of Professor's Haldane's 
works, and more particularly of Science ~ the Supernatural, 
where he commits himaelf on definite teachings and dogmas of 
the Catholic religion, will show that he is the inheritor of 
, 
the century-old melange of empiricism, nominalism and agnos-
ticism. In refuting his objections, then, we at the same time 
go a long way toward refuting the modern agnostic mind. We 
could, of course, consider the Professor's objections against 
the thesis we have chosen word for word, sentence for sen-
tence, and consider it time well spent. But a philosopnl.c 
treatise should do more than this. It should categorize and 
search for the causes of things. 
That he is an inheritor of the ideas above mentioned, 
Proiessor Haldane himsel.t tells us in h.i.s letters to Arnold 
Lunn and in several of his other works. 
~s a child I was not brought up in the tenets 
of any religion, but in a household where science 
and philosophy took the place of faith. As a boy I 
had very free access to contemporary thought, so 
tbAt I do not today find Einstein unintelligible, 
or Freud shocking. As a youth I fought through the 
war, and learned to appreciate sides of l:urnan char-
acter with which the ordinary intellectual is not 
brought into contact. As a man I am a biologist, 
and see the world from an angle which gives me an 
unaccustomed perspective, but not, I think, a 
wholly misleading one.l 
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In 1931, at the request of Arnold Lunn, Professor Hal-
dane agreed to an exchange of controversial letters on relig-
ion in its relation to science. In October, 1935, these 
letters were published under the title Science and the Super-
natural. At the time of the publication of this work he was 
professor of genetics at University College, University of 
London. He commands considerable authority in English 
scientific circles, but, like many modern irreligious scien-
tists who leave the boundaries of their fields, he attempts 
to explain everything, especially religious and moral matters, 
in terms of science, as witness his preoccupation with Dar-
winian evolution, his scoffing at miracles and religious 
dogma, and his bete noire, the problem of evil coexistent 
with a just God. But W.s own words sufficiently categorize 
him. 
I have not sufficiently examined the grounds 
on which I hold some of my opinions. Even had I 
done so to the best of my ability I have no doubt 
that I should be mistaken in many instances. How-
ever, in spite of this scepticism I think that I am 
probably nearer to the truth than you.2 
I do not now believe all that I have myself 
written. And, on the whole, my beliefs are a good 
deal more provisional tb~n I imagine yours to be. 
Before you have done with me you will regard me as 
a slippery customer, an unfair controversialist, 
and a nebulous thinker. This last I am, because 
(as I am well awe.re) the verbal and other symbols 
which I employ in thinking are inadequate to descri 
the universe.3 
Mr. E.I.Watkin gives an example of this nebulous thinking: 
Professor Haldane believes that the efficacy of 
11 
prayer as a means of obtaining Divine assistance 
has been, if not actually disproved, at least ren-
dered extremely unlikely by scientific experiment. 
Professor Galton, he tells us, believing, probably 
with truth, that more prayer is offered for 
sovereigns and the children of the clergy than for 
other classes of society, compared their longevity 
statistics with those of others living under similar 
conditions. He proved that their lives were on the 
average slightly shorter. Therefore, concludes 
Professor Haldane triumphantly, God does not answer 
prayers.4 
In all probability, my words and thoughts do 
not correspond exactly with reality.5 
I try to escape from such dilemmas (the relat-
ion of actions to character) by frankly admitting 
that our ideas about most, if not all, things are 
self-contradictory.6 
I am prepared to admit the possibility that I 
am nothing but a biologically and socially conven-
ient fiction, that some hundreds of millions of 
Buddhists, in fact, are correct in referring to the 
"illusion of personal identity." In any case, our 
words and other symbols are so inadequate to reality 
that it seems likely that any statement which can 
be made on any subject contains at least an element 
of falsehood, unless, perhaps, it is a purely 
logical statement.7 
MacDougall believes in the immortality of the 
soul, which I don 1 t.8 
I am a part of nature, and, like other natural 
objects, from a lightning flash to a mountain range, 
I shall last out my time and then finish. This 
prospect does not worry me~ because some of my work 
will not die when I do so.~ 
I am willing to be called a secularist ••• as 
conveying something more positive than the word 
"infidel. "10 
As a secularist and a biologist Haldane views everything 
in its relation to scientific findings. As a scoffer at th1n~ 
religious the supernatural is to him a myth. 
I still assert that the creeds are full of 
obsolete science.ll 
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Personally I regard the theory of transsub-
stantiation as a piece of pre-scientific chemistry.l 
He scoffs at miracles, 
But please do not ask me to investigate one.l3 
My own intellectual attitude to miracles is 
much the same as Hume•s.l4 
Hume had said that 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of Nature; 
and as a firm and unalterable experience has estab-
lished those laws, the proof against a miracle, 
from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as 
any argument from experience can be.l5 
As a further demonstration of the propriety of placing 
Haldane in the category of empirics and phenomenalists like 
Hume, Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Kant and James, his ideas on 
efficient causality follow. 
The assumption is made that the cause contains 
all the perfections of its effect. If this is so 
there is no real novelty. If there is real novelty, 
The First Cause is a matter of mainly historical 
interest.l6 
God is alleged to be a changeless being. Now, 
when I influence the world by an act of the will, 
this constitutes a change in me as well as in the 
world. Hence the attribution of a series of acts of 
will (not to mention incarnatl~n) to a changeless 
being seems to be impossible. 
Professor Haldane's metaphysical and religious stand-
point may be further studied in his work Kant's Scientific 
Thought and Possible \"!orlds, though even here he gives 
nothing definite. The efficacy of prayer can be scientificall 
disproved, there is very little ground to believe in personal 
,..., 
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immortality, we cannot tell whether or no there is a God. On 
the other hand, mechanism is adequate to explain tbe universe; 
some form of idealism--to which Kantism is the least inadequat 
approach made hitherto--is most probably the truest account 
of it, and if the human mind may be extinguished at death, it 
is quite as probable that it will be "merged into an infinite 
mind or something analogous to a mind which I have reason to 
suspect probably exists behind nature."l8 
It seems evident from the above quotations that what has 
been said by the various agnostics finds an echo in Haldane's 
writings. He is probably a greater scientist than those 
named, and it is in the scientific field almost exclusively 
that he finds fault with Christian and Catholic beliefs. More 
to the point in the present thesis, the professor, in reject-
ing a rational proof for the existence of God, rfghtly singles 
out St. Thomas as his main target. 
I have devoted a good deal of time to St. 
Thomas' arguments, for two reasons. They are 
probably the best of their kind. And you have 
adopted the usual Catholic theory that they are 
invincible. In an encyclical of 1879 Pope Leo XIII 
wrote: "It is well known that there have not been 
wanting heresiarchs who openly said that, if the 
doctrine of St. Thomas could be got rid of, they 
could easily give battle to other Catholic doctors, 
and overcome them, and scatter the Church." I do 
not regard St. Thomas as particularly difficult to 
get rid of; but I do not harbor the illusion that 
I shall scatter the Church, because it is not found-
ed on reason, but on emotion. St. Thomas' philo-
sophy is based on antiquated science and faulty 
mathematics.l9 
Professor Haldane is evidently more concerned with the 
~· 
------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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science contained in St. Thomas' arguments, and, as will be 
seen, with the physics and mathematics in the argument from 
motion. He either does not know or refuses to credit the fact 
that the Qu1.nque ~ are metaphysical arguments, and, as 
such, totally transcend the scientific findings of any age. 
But, even though the metaphysical principles contained in 
them sufficiently disprove the charges made against their 
validity, much space will te given to the physical side of 
the first argument in an attempt to prove, over and above 
what is strictly necessary, the cogency of the Thomistic 
argument from motion. 
,...-
------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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CHAPTER III 
The Possibility of a Rational Demonstration 
Before entering into a demonstration of' the metaphysical 
argument f'rom motion, we must meet the charges against the 
rationality of the proofs made not only by Professor Haldane, 
but also by the many modern ppilosophers we have named. 
The "the existence of' God can be rationally proved is a 
Catholic doctrine," is correct, and the Vatican Council has 
defined what can be known of' God by the natural light of' 
human reason. 
The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches 
that God, the beginning and end of' all th:1.ngs, may 
be known for certain by the natural light of human 
reason, by means of created things, "f'or tbe in-
visible things of' Him f'rom the creation of' the 
world are clearly seen, being understood from the 
things that are made" (Rom. I, 20); but that it 
pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself' 
and the eternal decrees of His will to mankind by 
another, namely, the supernatural way.l 
Canon I of this chapter reads: 
If anyone shall say that the one true God, 
our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by 
the natural llght of human reason through created 
things, let him be anathema.2 
Hence, it is heretical to maintain, as do the atheists 
and positivists, that there is no way by which we can arrive 
at the knowledge of God, or to assert with the most advanced 
traditionalists and fideists, that we can know God only 
through revelation or by some positive teaching received by 
tradition. In fact, the Congregation of the Inde:x, in con-
demning fideism, required the Abbe Bautain, in 1840, &nd 
Augustine Bonnetty, in 1855, to assent formally to the pro-
position (among others) that "human reasoning has the power 
to prove the existence of God with certainty (ratiocinatio 
cum certitudine probare valet)." Furthermore, this body 
declared: 
1'7 
The method employed by St. Thomas, St. Bona-
venture, and other scholastics after them, does not 
lead to rationalism, nor can it be blamed for the 
fact that the contemporary philosophy of the schools 
drifted into naturalism and pantheism. Hence no 
one has the right to reproach these doctors and 
teachers for having employed this method, especially 
since they did so with the at least tacit approval 
of the Church. 3 
The Scholastics have always considered as erroneous the 
opinion of those who denied the demonstrability, properly 
speaking, of God's existence. St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, 
Suarez and others have qualified this opinion as erroneous 
and manifestly false. 
The falseness of this opinion (of those who 
say that the existence of God is a tenet of faith 
alone and cannot be demonstrated) is shown to us as 
well by the art of demonstration, which teaches us 
to argue causes from effects, as also by the order 
of the sciences,--for if there be no knowable 
substance above sensible substances, there will be 
no science above physical science; as also by the 
efforts of philosophersa directed to the proof of 
the existence of God ••• ~ 
In these proofs, as Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange well points 
out, there is no question of a scientific demonstration, 
understanding by that term a process that does not go beyond 
the data of observation and experience. If reason tells us 
that the objects of experience are not self-explanatory, but 
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need a cause to render them real and intelligible~ and if 
reason further shows that the cause must go beyond the limits 
of observation and experience~ then there exists a philo-
sophical or metaphysical demonstration--the demonstration 
shown forth in the Quinque Viae. 
The present tendency is to explain everything in terms 
of science. Any attempt to bring Thomistic cosmology into 
relations with modern scientific advances will seem a ridicu-
lous anachronism to those who identify philosophy with science 
and who, like the contemporaries of Descartes and Newton~ 
are convinced that fresh progress in the sciences necessitates 
a new view of the entire universe. And yet it is quite true 
that the metaphysical principles of Thomistic cosmology were 
valid and have remained unimpaired throughout the centuries. 
Many an error and exaggeration would have been avoided in 
scientific research and theory had these principles been kept 
in view and followed. Materialism~ dynamism, and pure 
energetism would not now be plaguing science. These meta-
physical principles~ because they form part of tbe body of 
principles and doctrines which constitute the cardinal points 
not only of cosmology but of a harmonious and synthetic 
philosophy like ThomiSm, are capable of guiding and unifying 
the findings of present-day scientists. 
There are solid grounds for asserting that th~ 
principles of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy 
can be regarded as the presuppositions of the par-
ticular sciences with greater reason than can those 
19 
of modern idealistic and positivistic philosophy 
which either explains away the specific significance 
of the individual sciences~ or conversely, allows 
itself to be absorbed by them.5 
Our philosophy of nature seems to the modern 
mind to heve about as much to do with nature as have 
the speculations of Kant or Hegel. And yet, Aris-
totle's theory of material energy is the same as 
that us~d in modern physics, or more precisely, in 
thermodynamics. The world of physics is deserting 
Calileo and Newton and is going back to Aristotle 
without knowing it.6 
As Aristotle sbowed,7 the objects of the positive scien-
ces are essentially material and changeable, and consequently 
reach only the fringe of intelligibility. The intelligible 
element found in these sciences is to be found in the fact 
that they have recourse to the metaphysical principles of 
causality, induction and finality. In face, the certitude 
which is properly termed scientific grows in proportion as 
what o!'le affirms approaches nearer to the first principles 
which constitute the very structure of reason--the principle 
of identity implied in the most universal and simple of all 
ideas, the idea of being, and the principles of contradiction, 
causality and finality. 
The demonstration of the existence of God must in itself 
be more exacting than is the case in scientific demonstration. 
Not only must it establish from observation the need of an 
infinitely perfect cause, but must show whr it needs this 
cause and no other. It must not be hypothetical but conclus-
ive; it must of necessity flow from the highest and very first 
of all our ideas, namely, that of being. 
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Any demonstration of God's existence must not be and 
cannot be ~ priori, i.e. from cause to effect, because the 
proposition "God exists" is not per se evident for us. We do 
-- ---
not know the divine essence such as it is in itself; we can 
reach it only by means of positive analogical concepts which 
reveal to us the traits it has in common with created things. 
The demonstration, then, will have to be ~ posteriori, i.e. 
from effect to cause. To be a strictly metaphysical demon-
stration it must argue from the proper effect to the proper 
cause, which means to the necessary and i~nediate, the ab-
solutely first cause. Not in any series of accidentally 
connected past causes must the original cause be sought, but 
in the one in which there is an essential connection between 
the causes and in which we eventually arrive at one which 
must be the proper cause, without any further affirmation. 
Modern agnostics, in contemning the intelligence, like-
wise impugn the validity of first principles. Their denial of 
reason's ability to establish the existence of God is the 
logica.l conclusion to their premises, for the validity of 
the metaphysical proofs stands or falls with the admission of 
these first principles. In meeting Haldane's charges against 
the first argument, then, it is necessary to establish the 
validity of these primary concepts, that we may not fall into 
the error of presupposing that which we wish to pro .. re. 
Traditional theodicy is conceived entirely from the 
viewpoint of' being and the principles of being. Eve:ty faculty, 
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according to St. Thoma.s,8 has a formal object to which it is 
naturally ordained, which it attains first of all, and by 
which it attains everything else. The formal and adequate 
object of the intelligence is being. Our intelligence at 
first knows the essence of sensible things in a very confused 
manner, 1..mder the most general attribute of being.9 
The first notion conceived by the intellect is 
being, and thl8 notion of being is included in every 
apprehension. 
The intellect conceives being before aught else 
as somethinG most known, and into being it resolves 
all conceptfons.ll 
This initial arid confused concept tells us little about 
the constituent elements of tr.;e real, yet it comprises them 
all down to their last determinations. It is applicable to 
all reality, whether actual or possible, present, past, or 
future. It is applicable to every grade of reality, even to 
the angels, and to God Himself. No affirmation is possible 
without being; in fact, anyone who uses the verb "is" and make 
an affirmation necessarily accepts the philosophy of being 
with all its implications. The :moderns, witL all their 
categorical statements, seem to forget this. 
All the first principles flow from this notion of being. 
The first of these is the principle of contradiction, from 
which, in turn, the other first principles readily follow. 
The first indemonstrable principle which is 
based on the notion of being and not-being is this: 
the same thing cannot at once be affirmed and denied 
On this principle are based all o:·ther principles .12 
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The articles of faith stand in the same relat-
ion to the doctrine of faith as self-ev1.dent prin-
ciples to a teaching based on natural reason. 
Among these principles there is a certa1.n order: 
some are contained implicitly in others while all 
are reducible to this one basic principle: The same 
thing cannot at once be affirmed and denied.l3 
The first and fundamental judgment in the ontological 
order is a judgment of affirmation: being is; being: being. 
This is the principle of identity. It affirms that every-
thing is its own nature, that everything has a determined 
essence. The principle £! noncontradiction is a negative 
formula of tl:e same principle: the same being cannot be and 
not be at the same time and under the same formal aspect.l4 
Ivioreover, there is no third thing between being and nonbeing; 
being eith.er is or it is not. The principle of identity 
establishes the remote foundation .for tbe theistic arguments. 
Multiplicity, change, imperfection have not in themselves the 
reason of being. Their sufficient reason must be sought in 
One Who is pure identity, pure Being, pure actuality, pure 
perfection, and Who by that very fact is transcendent and es-
sentially distinct from the composite and changing world.l5 
The proximate foundation of the theistic arguments is 
the principle of sufficient reason, ~hich may be proposed as 
follows: everything must have a sufficient reason either in 
itself or in another, i.e. if what belongs to it is or is ~ot 
due to its essential constitution. The existence of a con-
tingent being finds a sufficient reason only in an extrinsic, 
necessary being; a means, which is not desired for its own 
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sake, derives its su:rficient reason :rrom the end for which it 
is intended. This extrinsic reason for being supplies the 
basis for efficient and final causality. 
The immediate foundation of the theistic arguments is the 
principle of efficient causality. To deny it, as do so many 
of tbe moderns, and as Professor Haldane at least implicitly 
in all his ar~Jments seems to, is to deny the principles of 
sufficient reason and of contradiction, and ultimately of 
being itself. In fact, it is intellectual suicide and a con-
demnation to eternal silence,l6 which the agnostics are not 
logical enough to see. 
Being is a transcendental--it transcends all the genera 
and species and is not limited to any one of them. It belongs 
to every member of the hierarchy of beings without implying of 
itself any of the limitations proper to each of ttem. It has 
the capability of being realized not only in the world of 
sense-knowledge, but also in one transcending ours. How do 
we know that being is de facto realized in tb.e world, or that 
God exists? The multiple, limited, contingent, changeable 
and imperfect things of this world cannot justify the presence 
in them of being. Since it cannot be doubted that they are, 
we look for a cause of their being. The only cause capable 
of realizing the existence of all contingent things is One 
which transcends them, which we call the supreme Being, Sub-
sistent Being, the First Cause, God. 
The theistic argu.nents are likewise all reduc-
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ible to being. If being as such did not dernand a 
cause, we could easily dispense with God. Par-
ticular causes would sufficiently account for 
particular effects. If from the latter we rise to 
a First Cause, it is because being is contained in 
a very real sense and special manner in each and 
every one of them. Theodicy, which is the crown of 
metaphysics, envisages God as the principle and 
source of being. He is called Mover, Cause, De-
signer, etc., only insofar as the effects implied 
by these titles are participations of being. The 
theistic arguments are five different ways of prov-
ing the existence of one and the same ~g.l7 
~----------------------------------------------------2-5-. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Traditional Argument and Haldane's Objections to It 
Anaxagoras seems to have been the first to have formed 
tbis argument from motion, when he asserted that the motion 
of mundane things proceeds from the divine intellect: 
~ ~ 2'. f " ~ ( ..... 1()" 
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Plato. held that there are souls which move themselves 
and bod~es, but that is is not demonstrable that God is the 
motor immobilis.2 Thus he concludes to the soul of the world, 
from which proceed movement in the world, and to the soul of 
the sun, which in a wide sense he calls God. 
The mainspring of Aristotle's argument is the proposition 
that an ontological regress cannot proceed to infinity; whence 
it follows that such a regress must terminate in an ultimate 
mover which is itself unrnoved.3 
In working out the details of his proof Aristotle is 
chiefly concerned with motion in space--with local motion, 
as the neo-Scholastics phrase it--and he is so because it is, 
so he tells us, the primary form of motion. None the less he 
also takes into account qualitative and quantitative change, 
which last manifests itself under the two forms of augmenta-
tion and diminution. In the third book of the Physics4he in-
eludes under the head of motion generation and corruption~ 
But in the fifth book5 he narrows down his classification so 
r 
r 
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as to exclude them. St. Thomas notes this inconsistency, 
but regards it as a mere matter of terminology. For generat-
ion and corruption obviously involve both qualitative and 
quantitative change, as well as local motion. Moreover, in 
-
the eighth. book of the Physics6 they are grouped with the 
other kinds of motion which are taken together as forming a 
common point of departure for the proof of a prime mover. 
St. Thomas reconciles the positions of Plato and 
Aristotle as to the prime mover by saying that Plato extends 
the concept of motion to include any operation, and hence 
was quite consistent in speaking of the source of motion as 
self-moving, inasmuch as it possesses both knowledge and 
desire; whereas Aristotle, in speaking of the prime mover as 
unmoved, intended only to assert that God is not involved in 
physical change, and did not mean to deny that intellectual 
activity can be predicated of Him.7 
The Thomistic proofs for the existence of God are 
formulated in the Summa Theologica and in the S1mroa Contra 
Gentiles. In both works the proofs are substantially the same 
they differ only in the wanner of their exposition. In gen-
eral they are more succinct and simplified in the Sumoa 
Theologica, since this work is intended for beginners, and 
present the matter from a more metaphysical point of view. 
The Sunrr.1a Contra Gentiles deals with the matter more fully, 
from a physical viewpoint and from an appeal to sense exper-
ience. This is especially true of the argument fron1 motion, 
which St. Thomas considers superior to the other four, as 
being the simplest and the easiest to grasp.a 
The Summa Theo~ogica sets out the proof from motion in 
the following form: 
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It is certain--and our senses witness to the 
fact--that there is movement in the world; every-
thing that moves is set in motion by something. 
Nothing, in fact, is in motion unless it be in 
potency with regard to that toward which it is 
moved; and nothing per contra moves anything except 
as it is in act. To-iet a thing in motion means to 
cause it to pass from potency to act. Now a thing 
can only be brought from potency to act by some-
thing which is in act. For instance, it is heat in 
act {for 'example, fire) which makes the wood, which 
is only potentially hot, actually hot, and to that 
extent, moves and alters it. But it is impossible 
for a thing to be both in acj and in potency at the 
same time in reference to the same things. Thus an 
actually hot thing cannot at the same time be act-
ually cold, but only potentially cold. It is there-
fore impossible for a thing to be, at the same time 
and in reference to the same things, both mover and 
moved, i.e. set in motion by itself. Whence we see 
that everything that is in motion, is moved by 
something else. If, on the other hand, that by 
which a thing is moved, is itself in movement, the 
reason is that it is, in its turn, set in motion by 
some other mover, which is again moved by another 
thing and so on. But it is impossible to regress 
in this way ad infinitum, because, in that case, 
there would oe no first mover, nor consequently 
other movers, for the second mover imparts movement 
only because the first set it in motion, as a stick 
moves only because the hand imparts movement to it. 
To explain movement it is consequently necessary to 
regress to a first mover which is itself not set in 
motion by anything, i.e. to God.9 
The argument in the Summa Contra Gentil~s is taken over 
directly from Aristotle: 
Everything that is set in motion, is so moved 
by something else. Now, it is e. matter of sense-
experience tr~t there is movement; for instance, 
r 29 the movement of the sun. Consequently the sun moves 
because something sets it in motion. But that 
which sets it in motion is either itself set in 
motion or it is not. If it is not, we have reached 
our conclusion, viz. the necessity of positing an 
immobile mover which we call God. If it is moved7 
there must be another mover that imparts movement 
to it. Therefore we must either regress to infinity 
or posit an immobile mover; now the regress to 
infinity is impossible: consequently we must assume 
a first inmobile mover.lO 
In this proof, two propositions require to be estab-
lished, first, that everything in motion receives motion from 
some other thing (~ quod movetur ab ~ movetur) 7 and, 
second, that we cannot regress to infinity in a series of 
things moved and moving (~ datur regressus in infinitum). 
Both of these propositions are amply proved by Aristotle and 
included in the Summa Contra Gentiles. We shall refer to them 
later when we answer Professor Haldane's sweeping objections 
to them. 
With the argument thus set before us, here is the place 
to detail Haldane's objections to the two propositions, in 
order that we may see just what his difficulties are, and how 
we may best answer him. 
With a desire to exhibit some degree of fairness, the 
Professor gives his version of the argument from motion. 
St. Thomas brings forl:Vard five proofs in the 
Summa Theologica, but cor.eentrates on tro first of 
them--the argument as to the unmoved mover, in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles ••• 
Some things move. Whatever is in motion is 
moved by something else. Hence either there is an 
immovable mover or an infinite series of things 
which move others and are themselves moved. But 
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this is impossible. So there is an immovable mover. 
(The word movere, here translated "to move," was 
used by mediaeval philosophers to denote other kinds 
of change. However, St. Thomas was mainly concerned 
with change of position, as shown by his rather un-
fortunate choice of the sun as the example of some-
thing which everyone would admit to be in motion. 
I use the word "move" as the English e qui valent, 
since it is u$.ed in the official translation by 
Dominican monks.)ll 
The argument thus summarized doesn't do it full justice, 
though it may perhaps be straining a point to call it a 
travesty, as Arnold Lunn does.l2 The big error in the 
criticism given by Haldane is that he objects to them on the 
ground that they are physical only. His criticism in full 
is given below. 
Let us now examine the first argument, taken 
from Aristotle. St. Thomas observes that two things 
must be proved, namely, that whatever is in motion 
is moved by another, and that it is impossible to 
proceed to infinity in movers and things moved. In 
my opinion both these propositions are false. The 
first is part of Aristotle's physics, but Newton's 
first law is as follows: "Every body continues in 
its state of rest of uniform motion in a straight 
line, except insofar as it may be compelled by force 
to change its state." I do not wish to use Newton 
as an authority, but his laws have been very ex-
tensively verified, and unless you are going to 
contend that Aristotle was right and Newton wrong I 
shall assume the opposite ••• It might be said that 
even in Newtonian physics every moving body had at 
some past time been set in motion by some other. 
But this was not what St. Thomas meant. In his 
argument against an infinite series of movers he 
wrote that "every body that moves through being 
moved is moved at the same time as it moves." Accor 
ding to the Aristotelian physics the sun and planets, 
for example, were actually kept in motion by the 
primum mobile.l3 
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The arguments against an infinite regress are 
as follows (these relate to Aristotle's proofs 
quoted by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles): 
(a) If it is true, an infinite num'6er of bodies 
must be in motion at once, vthich is impossible. 
Why is it impossible, if there is an infinite num-
ber of movable bodies? 
(b) If it is true, then in an infinite series of 
movers "there will be no first mover, but all will 
be intermediate movers, as it were. Therefore it 
will be impossib:ls for any of them to move, and thus 
nothing in the world can be moved." 
Now if this argument is correct, we can apply 
it to other series. A transposition of St. Thomas' 
argl~ent reads, "If there are an infinite number of 
points in a finite line traversed by a moving par-
ticle, then there will be no first point reached, 
but all will be intermediate points, as it were. 
Therefore it will be impossible for the particle to 
start." Now this contains two fallacies. Firstly, 
there are infinite series with a first D'!.ember. Thus 
if we consider that portion of a line running east 
and west which is not east of a given point nor more 
tnan ten miles west of it, this segment contains 
an infinite number of points; but there is a first 
point, namely, tbe given one. Secondly, there are 
series of points w:tth no first member, which can yet 
be traversed. Sush are the series of points lying 
west, but not more than ten miles west, of the given 
point. For every member of this series is some dis-
tance west of the given point, and within this dis-
tance, however small, a still nearer point can be 
found. 
St. Thomas' argument, if it were logically 
applied, would prove the impossibility of motion. 
It had been used for this purpose by Zeno the 
Eleatic. (c) This is the same argument as (b), in reverse 
order, depending on the alleged impossibility of an 
infinite series of movers. 
(d) If every mover is moved, this proposition is 
either true in itself or accidentally. Suppose it 
to be true accidentally, then it might be true that 
none ever was moved, in which case there would be 
no movement, which is absurd. 
This argunent being false, I need not detail 
the reasoning which proves that the above propositio 
is not true in itself, and hence that there is an 
i~novable mover. The fallacy is, of course, that 
the world might be such that some movers were 
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necessarily moved, and others just happened to be·. 
moved. In this case there would necessarily be some 
movement, but it might perhaps only be accidentally 
true that all movers are moved.l4 
He (S't. Thomas) argued, starting from a body 
in motion, namely, the sun, that its motion must be 
due to a mover. Thence he argued back to an unmoved 
mover, or unclll.anged changer. His \"lords, at least :J.n 
the Summa Theologica, leave' it open whether he 
thought that all the series of movers, from the sun 
to God, were acting simultaneously or successively. 
His argument is as valid in one case as in the other 
Hence, I did not, in attacking it, make the 
assumption least favorable to him, namely, that he 
thought all the movers were simultaneous. I gave 
him the benefit of the doubt, though quite aware 
that he inclined to the opinion of Aristotle, which, 
as I think, has been demolished by Newton. If, 
however, you think that in order to prove St. Thomas 
you must disprove Newton's view that a body in motio 
continues in motion unless something stops it, I 
shall be delighted to defend Newton.l5 
Of course an infinite series does not help me 
to get rid of dependence. Why should it? I have 
never come across anything which did not depend on 
something else, and I don't expect to ••• I quite 
e.gree with Dr. Patterson that however long we trace 
causes back "we are no nearer reachinf an ultimate 
and self-explanatory cause of motion. And however 
long we go on counting we do not get any nearer to 
a largest number, beQause there is no such thing. 
Why should there be?lo 
He (St. ThomAs) did not speak, like Professor 
Patterson, of an ultimate and self-explanatory 
source of motion. God is not self-explanatory, in 
my opinion.l7 
In Chapter II of this thesis we have set forth Professor 
Haldane's ideas on efficient causality. He argues that God 
could not contain ~11 the perfections of created things be-
cause, in that case, there would be no novelty in the world. 
Furthermore, if we attribute acts of will to God, He is not a 
changeless being. Thus he is led to conclude: 
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You see that St. Thomas' arguments disprove 
one another. He arrives at a certain theory about 
God, and this theory is self-contradict~ry ••• The 
correct conclusion from St. Thomas' chains of thought 
seems to be as follows: Certain arguments tend to 
prove the existence of a first cause. But if there 
iS a first cause we cannot know what it is, or even 
that it is a cause, or first. Hence these arg~~ents 
contain a fallacy. 
Many philosophers have come to this conclusion. 
Thus Kant held that reasoning as to a first cause 
inevitably led to antinomies.l8 
To sum up, the argument for an immovable mover, 
which was St. Thomas' main proof of the existence of 
God, rests on two false premises. One, that what-
ever is in motion is moved by another, is bad science. 
The other, that an infinite series of moves is im-
possible, is bad logic and bad mathematics.l9 
Here, then, is the indictment in full. A scientist of 
the twentieth century calls St. Thomas to task for his thir-
teenth century physics and mathematics. Professor Haldane has 
completely misread the argument. Nowhere does he acknowledge 
the metaphysical character of the theistic demonstrations, but 
claims that they fail by reason of their antiquated physics, 
chemistry and mathematics. So sweeping is his indictment of 
this first proof that our best way of answering him is to 
establish first its metaphysical character and then, insofar 
as we are able, to meet the difficulties raised not only by 
Professor Haldane but by most modern physicists as well against 
physical or local motion. 
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CHAPTER V 
Criticism of the Proof and of Haldane's Objections 
--~----- -- --- --- -- --~~~- -~-------
The argument from motion, or the kinesiological argument, 
as it is called, is based on the dynamical aspect of finite 
substances. Of the five metaphysical proofs which St. Thomas 
gives, he assigns to this the first place, as being the sim-~-· 
plest and easiest to grasp. In modern times it has suffered 
an eclipse owing to a belief that it depends upon a principle 
which physical science has shown to be untenable. As a matter 
of fact, the prejudice is due not to any of the results which 
physical science has achieved in recent times, but to an 
erroneous philosophy of motion, introduced by Descartes, which 
has widely affected current modes of thought. A careful 
consideration of the proof will show its apodictic character. 
It is securely based on those fundamental first principles 
which no physical discoveries can invalidate. In Chapter II 
we quoted from two modern Scholastic philosophers who are 
firmly convinced that present-day science owes more to an 
Aristotelico-Scholastic cosmology than it does to any of the 
idealistic and positivistic philosophies which these scientist 
theoretically profess. Moreover, there is a steady trend 
toward Aristotle which would undoubtedly surprise these men if 
they took the trouble to read the Stagiri te. 
But we must not try to validate the Aristotelian nor the 
thirteenth century physics. That would not only be unneces-
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sary but absurd. This argument is primarily in the metaphy-
sical order. Professor Haldane is not the only modern 
scientist to be confused. Professor A. Whitehead tells us: 
The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aris-
totle's thought was enmeshed in the details of an 
erroneous cosmology ••• l 
In this argument we take the great and universal fact 
of movement. All things are in constant change. Astronomy 
sets forth the revolutions and various movements of stellar 
bodies. Geology explains the development of the earth. Bio-
logy is busied with the phenomena of growth. Physics and 
chemistry reveal the molecular movements and the multiform 
combinations of inorganic elements. To take this fundamental 
phenomenon as the basis of an argument is to appeal to an 
obvious as well as to a metaphysical truth. There will be no 
question, then, about the fact of movement; as to the r1ature 
of movement there has been, even from ancient times, a serious 
controversy. On this point Aristotle took issue with the 
philosophers of his day, and this fact is the basis of much of 
modern p~losophy, as wit~ess the Hegelian system, with the 
teachings of which any treatise on the existence and attri-
butes of God is brought into contact. 
In ancient times Parmenides denied the fact of motion, 
as in quite modern times did Herbart • 
••• J.F.Herbart, qui motum fieri non posse his 
argu.mentis ostendere studuit: 10 Id, quod movet1~ 
vel mutatur, fit aliud. 20 Mutatio, si qua fieret, 
aut a causa externa aut a causa interna aut absolute 
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i.e sine causa, esset. Sed nihil horum secum non 
pugnat. Mutatio enim fieri nequit a causa externa; 
nam nulla res agere vel pati potest nisi in se ipsa; 
neque ita facere possemus, quin in processum in in-
finitum raperernur. Neque fieri potest mutatio a 
causa interna; unde enim mutatio caperet exordia? 
Accedit quod ita res una per oppositionem, quae in-
ter Agere et Pati intercedit, dirimeretur. Neque 
denique mutatio fieri potest absolute, i.e. sine 
causa; nam ex uno ente non potest oriri multiplex 
illa successionmn varietas, quae in qualibet 
mutatione conspicitur.2 
Heraclitus held the theory of perpetual motion in 
material things. The Hegelian system goes even further, teach 
ing that all t.bings are in a perpetual state of becoming. The 
to fieri is the central point of Hegel's Idealistic system. 
It is the medium between existing being and absolut"3 nothing. 
Hence there is only a constant movement and evolution and no 
repose. Bergson and LeRoy in very recent times have been 
enamored of the eternal flux idea, the 
Such a contradiction between science and metaphysics 
explains somewhat the disrepute into which the latter has 
fallen. If science finds it cannot harmonize with philosophy, 
then out goes philosophy. With philosophy goes religion--
hence the ease with which scientists discard the supernatural. 
Eegelian philosophy is based upon a scientific and meta-
physical error, and must be completely rejected. 3 
Taken in its widest sense, then, this proof claims to 
establish the existenooof a being immovable from every point 
of view, and, therefore, uncreated; for in the case of every 
created being there is at least the transition from non-being 
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to beine, which conflicts witL the notion of absolute imrnobil-
ity.4 We are clearly not restricting ourselves to the realm 
of local motion, whichSt. Thomas mentions as only one of the 
many forms of motion. The metaphysical notion of motion is 
our starting point. By motion is signified the process by 
which a potency is realized. It is not a form of being. It 
is something very different, namely, the transition from one 
form of being to another. This is well illustrated in any 
chemical compound. When sodium and chlorine are combined to 
form sodium chloride, or cor:trnon table salt, the process of 
change begins and ends with definite forms of being. During 
the process there is no natural entity capable of subsistence. 
(It is true that this actualization may sometimes be arrested, 
as in the case of a fertilized cell. The result, however, 
will not be a complete natural unit, but a frustrated beginnin 
of such a unit.) In the intermediate stages the final being 
is in a state of becoming--it is fieri, not esse. How well 
Aristotle observed this is seen from the fact that he did not 
include motion in his n~ne categories of being. 
There are several very definite characteristics to be 
noted in motion. It is always on the road to realization 
(in via ad~). So long as the process of realization is 
passing from potency to act, and is never com,letely actual-
ized, it is motion. There is no motion in a being tbat never 
leaves its starting-point, nor in that which has reached the 
terminus of the actualizing process. Hence Aristotle defined 
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motion as "the act of that which is potential inasmuch as it 
.: ...,. f / ~I ~ / ~ 5 is potential ( '1 rt~t/ o VYtifJAf.l oYros El'nA t.J£1ot '} rot~Jr~v') ~ 
Next, motion is divisible in infinitum. Each part is just as 
much motion as the whole, they are all different from each 
other, and they are not interchangeable. They are actuated in 
a definite order, and each is necessary to the whole process. 
From the observance of these two qualities we come to the 
third, which is important to the understanding of the argument 
to the unmoved mover. We have seen tbat motion is at once the 
result of the preceding and the producer of the succeeding 
part. At every stage of the motion process there is the 
emergence of something new, and that in a continuous passage 
from potentiality to actuality. Here the indispensable first 
principles play their part, and a denial of them is a denial 
not only of this argument, but of every rational argument. 
Becoming is the absence of identity. It is the successiv 
union of diverse, uninterchangeable, and new elements. To say 
that the successive union of diverse elements is unconditioned 
is to deny the principle of causality. To say that becoming 
does not postulate the continuous operation and influx of a 
cause (which preserves it in fieri, because motion is not bein 
and hence cannot be preserved in ~) is to deny the 
of sufficient reason and to establish contradiction in the ver 
heart of reality. To say that a thing, devoid of a particular 
form of being, is the cause in itself of the whole actualizing 
process, is too absurd to need refutation. In fact, motion, 
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which is becoming, and undetermined, if it were the sole cause 
of a being which is actualized, and hence determined, would 
produce something greater than lay in its power. The effect 
would exceed the cause. To affirm that one and the same thing 
is at once undetermined and determined, potency and act, moved 
and mover, is to deny the principle of contradiction. There 
is only one course left. If the world is in motion, it must 
be moved by something or someone other than itself--it needs 
the continuous operation of a present and actual cause. 
Thus motion is not a stable entity which can be produced 
once and for all, and then needs only to be conserved in ~· 
There must be a cause preserving the mobile in fieri, which 
cause was expressed by the Schoolmen in the words: Quidquid 
movetur ab alio movetur. 
As regards this principle, Aristotle is very instructive: 
We have now solved the difficulty, and shown 
that motion is in the thing moved. For it is the 
act of this latter effected by the agency of the 
mover. And. the act of the mover is not something 
other that it. For it must of necessity be the act 
of both. For the "mover" is so termed by reason of 
an active power which it possesses: and it is said 
to be "moving," because it exercises that power. 
But it exercises it in the thing moved, so that the 
act of both is one and the same ••• s 
Thus it follows, that wherever there is motion, there is 
not only a body which is being moved, but also an agent e~er­
giz5.ng and productive of motion. If there be motion, it is 
just as impossible that there should be no agent as that there 
should be no subject of the motion. 
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By motion St. Thomas certainly meant chan~e of any sort, 
not merely the passage of bodies through space. Indeed, if we 
were to occupy ourselves wholly with an analysis of physical 
motion as though it were the main point at issue, we should 
neglect the real metaphysical question which includes every 
change in its scope. We should have a valid argument, but 
only a partial one. Qualitative and quantitative alterations 
come equally under the head of motion. So also does intel-
lectual activity. This last seems to point to an inconsis-
tency on the part of St. Thomas in his attempt to reconcile 
Aristotle and Plato in regard to the prime mover. Plato 
equated motion with "any operation." 
Accipbbat enim motum pro qualibet operatione.7 
Aristotle, on the other hand, is said to have taken 
motion in its strictest sense according to which it is the 
act of something existing in potentiality as such. 
Aristoteles enim propria accepit motum, secun-
dum quod est acaus existentis in potentia secundum 
quod huiusmodi. 
Accordingly, Plato was justified in referring to God as 
a self-mover, since for him movement did not involve corpore-
ality; and Aristotle, on the other hand, was equally justified 
in affirming that God is an urm.oved mover, since for him move-
ment did involve both divisibility and corporeality. 9 So far 
there is no inconsistency. The discrepancy seems to arise 
when St. Thomas refers to intellectual activity as itself a 
form of movement. But the inconsistency is only verbal. 
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While in their precise and original sense the terms potential-
!!I and motion have significance only in regard to physical 
bodies in space, yet by a legitimate and natural extension 
they may be applied to immaterial and non-spatial entities 
such as the hu.L1an mind. Thus in the Sunnna Theologica we read: 
To be a subject and to be changed pertain to 
matter because it is in potentiality. Accordingly 
just as the potentiality of intellect is other than 
the potentiality of primary matter, so also the 
reason for being a subject and for undergoing change 
is different in the one case from what 5.t is in the 
other. ?or the intellect is subject to knowledge, 
and is changed from ignorance into knowledge be-
cause it is in potentiality with respect to the 
intelligible species.lO · 
It 1s clear, then, that for St. Thomas, the concepts of 
potentiality and motion, taken in the widest sense, were 
applicable to mind, inasmuch as it is subject to change; and 
that, consequently, he was justified in regarding mental 
activity as one of the presuppositions of the argument from 
motion, since the latter is based on these concepts. Fr. 
Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., has this to say on the matter: 
Le principe 1quidquid movetur ab alio movetu~,' 
loin de rep£ser sur une image spaciale, repose sur 
la nature meme du deYen!r, rendu intelligible en ... 
fonction, non pas de l'etre corporal, mais de l'etre 
objet formel de 1 1 intelligence. Aussi ~ette motion 
et ce principe peuvent-ils s'appliquer a un de~enir 
qui n'a rien de spacial, comme celui de volonte.ll 
Thus St. Thomas' argument is founded upon his conceptions 
of actuality and potentiality, and of the relation of one to 
the other. The potential is that which does not yet exist, 
but which is capable of existing as the result of the action 
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of an efficient cause. Indeed, this is one of the foundation-
stones of Thomistic philosophy, and is vital for the system. 
Cum potentia et actus divic~nt ens et quod-
libet genus entis.l2 
The very conception of the potential is derived from our 
experience of the actual, and as a matter of fact we observe 
in the generation of the members of a species that the poten-
tial is the result of a prior actuality. Furthermore, the 
potential, inasmuch as it is contingent and therefore capable 
both of existence and non-existence, implies in its very con-
ception that which exists by itself and of necessity. More-
over, since for St. Thomas motion is equivalent to change, 
the assertion that the actual is prior to the potential is 
equivalent to the proposition Quidquid movetur ab alio 
movetur. 
Why, we may ask, did St. Thomas in the Surr~a Contra 
Gentiles lay such stress on local motion? Dr. Patterson gives 
several reasons: 
In the first place local motion is the cause of 
quantitative and qualitative change in physical 
things, and in the second place, if mental operation 
are included in the definition of motion, the first 
argument is practically identical with the third, as 
the same principle is involved in both. In order 
to keep them at all distinct it is necessary to lay 
stress upon physical motion.l3 
There has been, it is true, some difficulty in keeping 
the first three arguments apart. The same general principle 
of sufficient reason or causality is involved, but each has 
a different starting-point. St. Thomas stressed local motion 
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chiefly because Aristotle had done so, but he certainly did 
not found his argument on local motion alone, as is clear from 
the wording of the argument. 
Verum est utique s. Thomam l.c. propositurum 
argumenturn dicere:. 'et sensu constat aliqua moveri 
in mundo.r Sed to et manifestat aperte illum non 
ex solo motu corporiS argumentum ducere, sed ex 
omni motu.l4 
Since there are adversaries who have, on the one hand, 
denied local motion, and some, on the other hand, who hold onl 
local motion, and that without recourse to a primus motor 
immobilia (as does Haldane), it is necessary to give more than 
a little space to the argument from local motion. 
The argument from local motion was first proposed by 
Aristotle and further developed by St. Thomas in the Summa 
Contra Gentiles. Suarez, however, rejects this proo~ as 
limited in range and lacking in strength. But, as Fr. Driscol 
says, "Suarez reasons from a peculiar kind o~ local motion 
and betrays the undeveloped condition o~ physics at the time." 
Suarez concludes his treatise: 
Igitur ex solo motu coeli nulla est s~~iciens 
via ad huiusmodi demonstrationem conficiendam.l6 
But what Suarez is a~ter is a metaphysical proo~, as Fr. 
Nolan notes,17 and hence he is not an adversary o~ this thesis, 
for he would certainly zrant the physical value of the argu-
ment from local motion. Nee-Scholastic writers like Cardinal 
Satolli, Fr. Pesch, Abbe Farges and Pere Garrigou-Lagrange 
have examined the .facts and laws revealed by the physical 
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sciences, and by their vindication of Aristotle's physical 
postulates of motion have demonstrated conclusively the 
vali:dity of this argument. Speaking directly against Descarte~ 
and his followers, whose physics of motion will later be 
examined, Garrigou-Lagrange says: 
, ~ Que le ~ouvement une fois~donne a un corps se 
continue indefinimeiJt, c'est la une fiction commode 
peut~etre pour rep~esenter certaines relations 
mathematiques ou mecaniques en astronomie, mais 
philosophiquement tres contestable.l8 
Physical science explains the phenomena of motion by 
attraction and repulsion, which it defines as the invisible 
power in nature which tends to draw bodies toge-::-ther or to 
repel them. The law.-formulated by Newton-- a body attracts 
another body in the direct ratio of the squares of the masses 
and the inverse square of the distances--is a law that holds 
universal sway throughout the material world. Astronomy in 
the stellar bodies, Physics and Chemistry in the molecules of 
bodies, enunciate this law. But while the fact is recognized, 
its nature is disputed. The ~1echanists, following Descartes, 
treat motion as something added to a fully actualized entity--
no passage from potency to act. In metaphysics it is on the 
contrary the passage to actualization (~ ~ ~). Descartes 
treated motion as a state; metaphysically, it cannot be treatec 
as a state, because motion is essentially transient. He con-
tended that motion passed. from one body to another; but motion, 
not being a complete entity, cannot iJe handed on. All tl1Rt is 
possible is that the force which generates and maintains 
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motion in one body should generate a second motion in another. 
Were Descartes correct in his hypothesis, the proposition 
Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur would have to be abandoned in 
-------- -- ---- ~~~~ 
the case of local motion. 
The Dynamists, on the other hand, following Leibniz, 
maintain that matter is not purely passive, and they appeal to 
ordinar;~r observation and scientific experiment as re~realing in 
matter an active element. Matter possesses in itself the 
power to act upon matter, and the conclusion is that a 
primordial mover or initial cause of movement is unnecessary. 
It is a peculiar fact that this argument of the Dynamists, 
contrary to their contention , involves the necessity of a 
communication to matter of motion from some source, which we 
call the prime mover. 
We have seen how Professor Haldane and other modern 
scientists reject the two propositions of this argument on the 
ground that they are inextricably bound up with Aristotelian 
and medieval science. 
In my opini.on both ••• propositions are false. 
The first is part of Aristotle's physics ••• I do not 
wish to use Newton as an authority, but his laws 
have been very extensively verified, and unless you 
are going to contend that Aristotle was right and 
Newton wrong I shall assume the opposite,l9 
Does the principle Quidquid movetur !£ alio movetur 
conflict with Newton's first law? This law states that a 
body in a state of motion persists in that state unless it is 
subjected to the action of some external force. It would 
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seem to follow the.t a body once put in motion does not need 
an agency for continuing the motion--that a body once started 
would go on of itself. The example of the billiard ball is 
the one most frequently advanced. Once the cue has imparted 
motion to the ball, where is there an external force to con-
tinue this movement? Is it not sufficient to say that the 
motion once imparted is the explanation of all subsequent 
motion, and that the ball eventually comes to rest by the 
friction of the cloth and the resistance of the atmosphere? 
Certainly, a continued application of an external force is 
not evident to the senses, but we can argue to its necessity 
from the impossibilities involved apart from it. 
If the efficient cause of the motion is not external, 
two hypotheses are possible. The sufficient cause of the 
effect is either to be found in the moving body itself, or in 
its past motion. Suppose it to lie in the body's past motion. 
We are dealing with actual motion for which an actually 
operative cause is necessary. The past motion does not novr 
exist. But what does not now exist cannot be actually 
operative. The past motion was necessary that the body be 
able to advance to where it now is. Its job is finished--
it is t~e movebat, the necessary antecedent in all motion. 
What does not exist cannot possibly produce the new effect 
successively brought into being as the moving body advances. 
The other hypothesis, namely, that the sufficient cause 
is to be found in the moving body itself, is more difficult 
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to answer. You cannot, of course, say that the ball is the 
reason of its own motion. This would say nothing more than 
that the reason why it moves is that it is in motion--which 
answers nothing. Certain recent Scholastics have revived an 
ingenious hypothesis which at first sight seems good, but upon 
closer examination exhibits certain faults. Thms theory, 
proposed by the old Scholastics and advanced by the Neo-
Scholastics, Frs. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P~Oand Pesch, S.J.,21 
states that the cause which co~nunicates motion to a body 
puts in that body a new quality--impetus or impulsus--which 
produces local motion so long s.s the motion endures. When 
the impetus is exhausted, the motion ceases. Fr. Joyce, S.J., 
attacks this theory with rather close reasoning, which we 
give in full: 
(1) Unless we are prepared to deny all validity 
to the first law of motion, we must admit that if a 
body is once set in motion, this movement would 
never cease, were it not for the action of impeding 
forces; as regards duration it would be infinite. 
Yet a corporeal quality which is a principle of 
movement without end appears to involve a sheer 
contradiction. An accident is necessarily pro-
portioned to the substance which it q·ualifies and 
in which it inheres. But according to this hypo-
thesis, a finite substance is the subject of a 
quality, wh:tch in one respect at least, is infinite. 
(2) Further, even if this be supposed possible, 
another difficulty presents itself. The inherent 
impetus must constantly produce new effects; for, as 
we have pointed out, the parts of any given motion 
differ from one another, occurring, as they do, in 
a definite order, the previous stages being pre-
requisites to the production of each subsequent one. 
But it is manifest that the same quality cannot be 
continuously modifying its eff~ciency unless it is 
undergoing change itself. We have, in fact, merely 
shifted the difficulty from the motion to the 
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alleged quality which produces it. We must provide 
an explanation for the change in the quality. 
{3) Again: the impetus, if it exist, is actually 
operative, and in consequence not indeterminate but 
fully determined. Yet we are required to regard thi 
fully det~rmined q1J~li t:y as being a principle of 
motion which is ind,'-ifferently of any velocity and 
of any direction. According to the laws of motion 
a body in constrained motion will leave its path 
and fly off at a tangent at whatever point of its 
course the constraint is removed. Now there is no 
need that the constraint should be due to a single 
force acting from one centre. Successive forces 
may have been brought to "bear upon the body from 
widely different quarters. But, if we accept the 
theory in question, it is reserved for the last of 
all to determine the velocity and the direction of 
the effects of every one. Such a result seems 
wholly irreconcilable with reason.22 
Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange explicitly states that the quality 
of impetus must be finite, and of necessity cannot persevere 
to infinity. But, in so speaking, he implicitly denies 
validity to the first law of motion, which does not seem to 
be so easily laid aside. There are others, as Gredt,23 who 
hold that the quality of impetus once received cannot be 
destroyed or remitted: whence the motion will endure in 
aeternum unless checked by some external object. Fr. Joyce 
seems to have refuted both these opinions. There is a third 
theory, which, until a better happens along, presents a good 
e.xplana tion. Fr. Hoenen, s. J. 24 advances the hypothesis 
that motion perseveres because of the continuous action and 
reaction of the ether. Fr. Boyer, S.J.25 is of the same mind. 
Everyone is agreed that an external force is needed in 
the case of motion starting from rest. Likewise, it is 
uni veJ•sally admitted that an external force is needed ante-
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cedently to all changes in the rate of movement and of all 
deviations from a straight line, even when these confer~ to 
law. Would it not be curious if an external agent were 
required for the maintenance of motion in an ellipse, for 
instance, or in a parabola, but not in a straight line? Does 
the fact that Newton posited uniform motion necessarily 
indicate the exclusion of external agency considered necessary 
for changes of the rate of motion? 
Only in the single hypothetical case of abso-
lute uniformity of movement in a stBaight line can 
Newton and Aristotle be made to appear to contra-
dict each other. But what would be the reality 
answering to our idea of a body so moving? It would 
be a body now, for the moment, here, but with a 
definite and energetic potency to move away: nothing 
more. Motion, as such, does not, and cannot exist 
as a whole. But the potency manifests its reality 
by continuously passing into the act of movement, 
without ceasing to be potential. The continuous 
transition means continuous external agency. To 
say that a body must move because it can move would 
be absurd. When-n6Wton;-therefore, proceens-in the 
second part of his First Law to declare that "a body 
in motion will continue to move uniformly in a 
straight line unless acted upon by an external force' 
he should be taken to exclude only a certain class 
of external agencies, those, viz., which he calls 
"forces." 0 therwise he is in plain contra.d:tction, 
not only to Aristotle and St. Thomas, but also to 
common sense.26 
We are driven then to the conclusion that all motion 
requires the continuous action of an external force to explain 
its persistence, and that without such agency the motion must 
cease. When Aristotle and St. Thomas laid dmvn the principle 
~uidquid movetur ab alio movetur they did not make a stab in 
the dark, but had weighty reasons for their thesis. And 
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Newton, to the chagrin of Haldane and other anti-Scholastics, 
does not go beyond this principle. The fact is, be did not 
go as far as Aristotle and St. Thomas. He did not deny that 
the uniform motion itself is due to an agency ab extra, but 
merely that it is produced by an agency belonging to that 
category of agents which he denominated "external forces.•• 
Does the fact that Newton used the plural term "forcest• 
contradict our single prime mover? Not at all. It is a fact 
of physics that a plurality of forces is brought to bear on 
a moving body, but it is likwise evident that these forces 
coalesce into a single motion. It is a philosophic truth 
that when many agents are employed in the execution of a work 
which bas a true unity, the work must be attributed to the 
principal agent which uses the others instrumentally. Then 
we must conclude that the phenomenon of local motion reveals 
the existence of two orders of movers, the lower of the two 
being the order stressed by Newton. It may be true, as we 
quoted Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange above, and as Fr. Nolan observes, 
that Newton's law is an hypothesis suggested by the facts, 
and cannot be proved experimentally. Fr. Joyce, however, 
who has gone into the matter at length, prefers to call it 
Ua logical abstraction based on a wide ind.uction.tt2'7 
Thus Newton's first law as manifested in external 
phenomena provides the most cogent evidence for the truth of 
our thesis. Either there exists a higher mover or multi-
plicity can be the source of unity. Haldane's remark, then, 
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that the first part of St. Thomas' thesis is "bad science," 
is quite sadly beside the mark. 
V/hat is that agency which even Newton's law demands? 
We may conclude this first proposition of the thesis with the 
words of Fr. Rigby, S.J.: 
The agency required is or a higher and more 
universal order than that to which mechanical 
forces belong. It transcends the possibility of 
measurement in terms of time and space. It is 
continuously at work in moving bodies, reducing and 
tending to reduce the manifold to unity, the variab 
to uniformity, and that which is liable to fail to 
indefectibility; in one word, reducing potential! ty 
to act, and so establishing and crowning the results 
achieved by the agency of material things.28 
Non datur regressus in infinitum. 
In this second part of tl .... e argument we see more clearly 
still the necessity of the concepts of act and potency, and 
hence the validity of the metaphysical argument. The funda-
mental conception of the whole thesis is that the potential 
cannot per ~ pass into actuality, for this would say that the 
non-existent can be the cause of the existent. In other 
words, were the potential capable of becoming actual of itsel:r 
it would be its own cause, which is to say that it existed 
before it began to exist--an evident absurdity. Consequently, 
we must posit the existence of some other entity, which, 
itself wholly actual, is capable of being and acting as a 
cause, and through its ae;ency the passage from potentiality 
to actuality must be accomplished. This entity must either be 
eternal and changeless, or is itself likewise in motion. 
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According to the first we have reached the primus motor 
i~~obilis--God; according to the second we must posit a third 
entity which in its turn must act as a cause. And so on 
indefinitely. 
An infinite regress, however, is impossible. Were the1•e 
no prime mover, but only a series of secondary agents, there 
could be no motion. For a secondary agent cannot per !! pass 
from potency to act, as we have shown. Its activity from 
moment to moment and during each successive phase of movement 
is due to the influx of a higher cause. But if all the causes 
were secondary, and there were no prime mover--the sufficient 
reason for its own action--no motion would ever arise. We 
must bear in mind, however, that the priority of the unmoved 
mover is a logical priority, not a temporal one. St. Thomas 
saw this distinction as necessary to the discussion of the 
question whether the world were created from eternity or no. 
in his Con~entary ~Peter Lombard's Sentences, he says: 
Quod eundem effe c tum praecedere causas infini tas 
per se, vel essentialiter, est impossibile; sed 
accidentaliter est possibile; hoc est dictu, aliquem 
affectum de cuius ratione sit quod procedit a causis 
infinitis, esse impossibilem; sed causas illas 
quarum multipllcatio nihil interest ad affectum, 
accidit effectui esse infinitas. verbi gratia, ad 
esse cultelli exigunt1~ per se aliquae causae moven-
tes, sicut faber et instrumentum; et haec esse 
infinita est impossibile, quia ex hoc sequeretu~ 
infinita' esse simul actu; sed quod cultellus factus 
a quodam fabro sene, qui multoties instrumenta sua 
renovavit, sequitur multitudinem successivam in-
strwnentorum, hoc est per accidens; et nihil prohioet 
esse infinita instrumenta praecedentia istum culte!J.. 
lum, si faber fuisset ab aeterno.29 
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Thus there is nothing contradictory in the conception 
of an infinite number of secondary causes succeeding each other 
in tu1e. In fact, St. Thomas clearly saw the impossibility 
of disproving it philosophically. This is not to say that he 
believed in the actual existence of such a series, for this 
would be to hold the eternity of the world, and to depart from 
the teaching of the Church and Revelation. St. Thomas was an 
innovator in many phases of his philosophy, and never more so 
than in this point. And, like all innovators, he was vehement-
ly attacked for his daring teachings. But, though he held it 
illegitimate to argue to the existence of God from the supposed 
necessity of a prius to the temporal series, his contention 
was that every causal series, whether temporally finite or 
infinite, is inherently contradictory unless regarded as 
dependent upon an ultimate cause which is not in time at all. 
In any such series each member is moved by its predecessor, and 
this in turn by the member previous to it; and though we pro-
ceed in this manner to infinity, we are no nearer reaclung an 
ultimate and self-explanatory source of motion. 
Professor Haldane rejected this second proposition bn the 
ground that it was bad logic and bad mathematics.30 He re-
jects one after the other the four proofs given by Aristotle 
a~d included by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, as we 
have seen in Chapter IV. "Why,tt he asks, "is it impossible 
for an infinite number of bodies to be in motion at once, if 
there is an infinite number of movable bodies?tt3l But that is 
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precisely the point. Is there an infinite number of movable 
bodies? Haldane makes a gratuit9us assumption, which Aristotle 
and St. Thomas saw to contain a contradiction. 
If you reg:r•ess ad infinitum in the series of 
things mo11ed and moving, you must assume an infinite 
number of bodies, for e7erything that is in motion 
is divisible and consequently a body. Now, every 
body which moves and is moved, is in motion simul-
taneously imparting movement. Hence, all this 
infinite number of bodies which impart movement 
because themselves set in motion, must move simul-
taneously, if one of them moves. But each of them 
must, as it is in itself a finite body, move in a 
finite time, therefore the infinite number of bodies 
moving simultaneously, must be in motion in a finite 
time. But this is impossible. It is therefore im-
possible to regress ad infinitum in the series of 
things moved and moving. 
Moreover, the impossibility of an infinite 
nmnber of bodies being in motion in a finite time, 
is proved by Aristotle in this way: the thing that 
eives and the thing that receives motion must be 
together, as can ue shown inductively by reviewing 
all the kinds of movement. But bodies can be 
together only by continuity or contiguity. Since 
the1•efore all the things moired and moving are 
ne0essarily bodies, they must form, as it were, a 
single moving object, the parts of which are in 
contiguity or continuity. And thus a single in-
finite thing would have to be in motion in a finite 
time--a pro~osition which Aristotle r'aS proved to be 
impossible.32 
The second argument, showing the impossibility of an 
infinite regress, summarized by Professor Haldane and quoted 
in Chapter IV of this thesis, reads as follows in Aristotle: 
If a series of things moved and moving are 
a:::rangecl in order, i.e. if they form a series in 
which each thing gi~1es movement to the next, it is 
inevitable that, if the first mover disappears or 
ceases to move, none of the following things will be 
either moving or moved: it is in fact the first move 
that imparts the power of movement to all the others 
Now, if we deal with an infinite series of things 
moving and moved, there will be no first mover and 
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all the things will function as intermediate movers. 
Consequently, in the absence of a first mover, 
nothing will be moved and there will be no movement 
in the world.33 
As we saw, Haldane finds fault with this reasoning by 
bringing in e:x9.I!J.ples of infinite series of points on given 
lines. Thus, says Haldane, professing to follow the reason-
ing of St. Thomas and Ar1$totle, a moving particle attempting 
to traverse this infinite series of points would be unable 
to reach the first point, but a.ll would be intermediate points 
Hence there would be no movement. Since there are infinite 
series of points, the argument is absurd.34 Arnold Lunn 
rightly accuses his correspondent of confusing the infinite 
divisibility of a continuous line with the possibility of an 
j_nfinite number of real changes in real entities.35 Haldane 
notes other infinite series of the mathematicians, saying that 
they are cownon and easily handled. As a parting thrust, he 
accuses the Scholastics of founding their first four arguments 
for the existence of God on the objection they felt to infin:lt 
series. 36 
That St. Thomas felt any objection to infinlte series in 
his proof of the existence of the Unmoved. Mover is only partly 
true, and is quite beside the point. He does not argue that 
an infinite regress is impossible, but that an infinite regres 
does not get rid of contingency and dependence. In fact, he 
contended tr...a t it is entirely :I.llegi tima te to argue to the 
existence of God from the supposed necessity of a prius to the 
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temporal series, as was noted above. In the arguments against 
an infinite regress there is no reference to any beginning of 
movement in time. They merely establish that in the universe 
as actually given, movement, as actually given, would be un-
intelligible without a .First Mover communicating it to all 
things. Thus nothing would have toJ:bB.nged in the proofs if 
the false assumption of the etel"nity of movement were ad-
'111tted. St. Thomas espressly states this in the Sunnna Contra 
Gentiles. 37 Catholic dogma teaches that the world vvas 
created in time, but St. Thomas was firmly convinced that 
this fact could not be proved philosophically. It would have 
been very easy for St. Thomas to establish this first proof' 
had he started from this fact of Revelation, for everything 
that is produced requires a cause originating the new thing, 
since nothing can· transfer itself' from potency to act, from 
non-being to being. Thus, in giving preferen.ce to the 
assumption of the eternity of the world and of movement, he 
took tr..e more difficult way, and, in proving his thesis, 
a fortiori proved it on the hypothesis of a universe and move-
ment which had a beginning in time. 
St. Thomas, then, admits the ir:1posslbility of disproving 
the e.:xistence of inf:tni te sertes in time wt th the aid of 
reason alone. But such a series, if it really exists, cannot 
te actually infinite, that is, per !! and essentla.lly. For 
instance, the manufacture of a knife demands a movir~ cause# 
i.e. other instruments; tbese instruments, in turn, demand a 
r 
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cause, the 'vorkman who makes them; the workman also demands an 
efficient cause. Hence there is no proceeding to infinity in 
such mcv1.ng causes. If Professor Ealdane were to demand that 
his infinite series be actually existent, as he seems to 
demand, he would involve himself in an absurdity. St. Thomas 
did say that there was nothing repugnant in the concept of an 
infinite series of accidentally subordinate movers which are 
only instruments, for example, in the hands of a workman.38 
But the point of the whole argument is the necessity of get-
ting rid of contingency in such a series. You may argue as 
long as you like that the hands of a watch are moved by the 
spring, the spring by a wheel, that wheel by another, and so 
on ad infinitum, but you never get rid of contingency--you 
never give a sufficient reason for the movement. Contingent 
beings have not in themselves the reason why they should 
exist rather than not exist, why they should move rather than 
not move. In the absence of a necessary cause or mover they 
simply would not be or move. Hence, the irritated remark of 
Haldane: "of course an infinite series does not help me to 
get rid of dependence. Why should i t?tt39 is not the least of 
his absurdities. 
Professor Gilson, paraphrasing St. Thomas, gives the 
reason why an infinite regress at tr,e present moment when we 
consider the universe, would be an absurdity. 
The reason is that the causes, o~ the series 
of which we argue, are hierarchically arranged; i.e. 
that, in the assumption on which the prDof from the 
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first Movez• rests, everything that is in motion is 
given motion by a moving cause, superior to it, and 
which consequently is the cause both of its own 
movement and of its moving pow·er. What the super•ior 
cause has to account for, is not only the movement 
of the individual thing of any degree (for another 
individual of the same degree would suffice to ex-
plain it, as one stone moves another stone), but the 
movement of the whole species. It is true that, 
ta~ing our standpoint within a species, we see with-
out difficulty the sufficient reason of the individu-
als or of the movements in question, once the species 
is given; but each individual or each moving cause, 
having ~ hypothesi rece:tved from another its nature 
and power of movement, can no longer be considered 
as being itself the cause of its nature or its power. 
But the 9roblem presents itself in the same manner 
for each individual of the species under discussion, 
since, for each, the nature defining it, has been 
received from outside. The sufficient reason for 
the efficacy of the individuals must therefore be 
sought outside or above the species.40 Consequently 
we must either suppose that whatever receives its 
nature, is at the same time the cause of it and 
tl~refore the cause of itself--which is absurd; or 
that everything which acts by virtue of a nature 
received, is only an instrumental cause, leading back 
through superior causes, to a first cause.41 
Having found fault with the second of Aristotle's proofs 
against an infinite regress, Professor Haldane logically dis-
misses the third, since it is only the second in reverse order. 
Aristotle's words are lucid enough, and, joined with the 
reasoning just given in the second proof, should sufficiently 
answer the objection brought against this third one. 
We begin with tbe superior term and argue thus: 
The intermediate moving cause cannot impart movement, 
unless there be a primary moving cause. But in an 
infinite regress of a series of moved and. moving 
things, all are at the same time moved and moving. 
Therefore only intermediate moving causes exist, and, 
s1nce there is no primary moving cause, there will be 
no moven1ent in the wol .. ld; unless, indeed, we should 
ever observe an axe or saw operatj_ng without the 
action of the carpenter.42 
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These~ then~ are the proofs by which Aristotle and St. 
Thomas establish the second proposition and the existence of a 
first imrnobile mover. After these three there is included 
another argument~ by which the same conclusion to the immobile 
mover is reached indirectly~ namely~ by showing that the 
proposition (implicitly contained in the first argument) "What-
ever imparts motion is set in motion by another" is not a 
necessary proposition, i.e. one in which the predicate is con-
tained in the very notion of the subject and the truth of 
which is absolute and universal. Haldane contends that "the 
world might be such that some movers are necessarily moved, 
and some just happened to be moved. In this case there would 
necessarily be some movement, but it might perhaps only be 
accidentally true that all movers are moved."43 The professor 
seems to have lost the point of this argument~ which is to 
disprove an infinite regress. Since this part of the argument 
is given at great length in the Summa Contra Gentiles,44 it 
will suffice to summarize it here. 
If the proposition "Whatever imparts motion is set in l11.0-
tion by a nothern is true only accidentally, then it is possible 
that none of the things which impart movement are themselves 
in motion~ a proposition that is denied by all thinking men. 
Therefore~ if it is possible that nothing is in motion~ it!s pos 
sible that there is no longer anything that imparts motion~ 
and hence no movement. The proposition is thus not true 
accidentally. 
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An impossibility results if we say that the proposition is 
true necessarily. For thus the mover may receive either a 
motion of the same kind which it imparts, or a motion of a 
different kind. If it receives a motion of the same kind, it 
follows that everything that pro~uces a change, is itself 
changed, everything that heals is itself ~ealed, etc. This is 
evidently impossible. On the. other hand, if the mover receives 
a movement of a different kind, it would follow, since the 
number of kinds and forms of movement are finite, that a re-
gress ad infini tu...rn would i)e impossible. 
Some scientists have argued that motion in a circle does 
not require a first mover. They argue that one molecule on 
a circle can move a second, the second a third, the third a 
fourth, and so on until the last of the series moves the first, 
w~ereupon the process is repeated. But, either the movement 
had a beginning or it did not. If the former, then our argumen 
is granted and we have a prime mover. If the movement had not 
a beginning, then we must a&nit that the first molecule was at 
the same time in a state of motion and in a state of repose. 
It is in motion because it moves t~e second molecule; it is in 
repose because 1 t is moved by the last molecule. r=ere -.,;e are 
face to face with a contradictlon, and the conclusion is forced 
upon us that there exists an ezternal first mover.45 
i.:odern scientists have conceived motion as relative to a 
closed system, understanding by that term a system of bodies 
r 
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and forces so ordered that it may be considered as an integral 
whole, prescinding from all forces external to it. Viewed 
absolutely it may be undergoing no transference in space. But 
this hypothesis cloes not affect the Aristotelian argument, 
since relative motion necessarily involves absolute moticn.46 
From all these arguments we can readily see that all 
move~ent necessarily implies a mover other than itself, that 
as long as there is motion there is an efficient cause pro-
ducing t~at motion, and that however far we regress in things 
moving and moved we never arrive at a sufficient explanation 
of movement unless we posit a first in t~e series. That this 
Prime Mover must be itself unmoved flows directly from the 
impossibility of an infinite regress. That the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic argur1ent contains no faulty logic seems to be 
evident, and as to the charge of "bad mathematics," this is 
equAlly absurd, for, granted the metaphysical correctness of 
the argument, it cannot contradict the principles of mathe-
matics. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Primus Motor Immobilia 
It may be objected that the argument from motion does not 
conclude to the existence of God, but merely to a flrst mover 
unmoved. Strictly speaking, the objection has some validity. 
St. Thomas says in the Summa Theologies. that, if we speak of 
a first Mover not set in motion by anything else, e"Teryone 
wi.ll understand that we mean God.l He did not expect us to 
accept this conclusion as pure and simple evidence: we shall 
get the full proof when all the Divlne attributes which hur.:an 
reason can apprehend from this notion of a first inunobile 
I•i.over art} developed. 
As we saw from the proof, the primus Motor immobilia is 
really a mover, by which is understood an efficient cause 
which reduces a movable oeing from potency to act. It is 
inunobile not in the sense that it lacks activity, but in the 
sense that it moves without being moved, i.e. without receivin 
any perfection toward which it is said to move, and that it is 
not in potency to receiving any real act. 
gette cause premiere, nous la disons irn..11obile 
assurement, mais seulement en ce sens qq 1elle n'est 
pas mue par un autre, qu 1 elle est premiere ab~olu­
ment dansc~rora:re; en d'autres termes, l'idee 
d 1 1m~obi~ite ici qe·fait que nier absolument toute 
passivite, c 1 est-a-dire sous forme positive, qu 1 elle 
a.f~irme dans le premier moteur universe~ une 
plenl tude exclusive de tou te privation. 
It is first ontologically, or the efficient cause for 
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which no other cause is required, and from which proceed as 
from the supreme self-sufficing principle both the motion it-
self and ultj_mately the whole series of movers. 
From this notion of the immobile prime mover we can 
deduce more than sufficient attributes to prove that the notio 
is predicable only of God. 
1. The prime mover is pure act, i.e. there is nothing 
potential in it. The argument has already excluded all 
potentiality in the order of action. The prime mover not only 
can act, but its action is identical with itself. Therefore, 
there can be no potentiality in its beine;, for 11 operari 
sequitur ~ ~ modus operandi modum essendi." That which is 
self-operative must be self-existent. If there were in this 
prime mover a transition from non-being to being, this could 
be so only in virtue of a higher cause, and then we should no 
loncer have the prime mover.3 
2. The prime mover is infinitely perfect, because it is 
pu!'e actuality without any admixture of potentiality. This is 
equally true whether we consider the essence or the action of 
such a being.4 
Act means the determination of being in point 
of accomplishment and perfection; pure act is, there-
fore, pure perfection. It is at the same time pure 
being; pure intellect:ton, al·uays in act, of pure 
being always actually known; pure love, alwa:rs in 
act, of the plenitude of bei~g always actually 
loved.5 
3. The pr5.me mover is immaterial and incorporeal. It is 
immaterial uecause matter is essentially a potential subject, 
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susceptible of change, preeminently the subject of becoming. 
The prime mover is, on the contrary, pure act, totally without 
becoming. It is not corporeal because not material. A body 
is composed of parts and depends on parts, whereas the pure 
act excludes all composition and dependency. There is no 
question of more perfect or less perfect in the prime moYer, 
because, being pure act, it is pure perfection.6 
4. The prime mover is intelligent. Immateriality is the 
basis of intellieibility and of intelligence.7 Moreover, that 
which moves aJ.l things toward an end must itself know that end 
and the proportion of the things ordered toward that end. 
5. The prime mover is omnipresent, because to move all 
things demands the presence of the mover. 
6. The prime mover is eternal, because it always has of 
itself being and activity without any change. With it there 
can be no question of time, for time ~eans succession, which 
is impossible in pure act. 
7. The prime mover is unique, because pure act cannot be 
multiplied. Were two pul"'e acts to be posited, then neither 
would be pure act, for the very notion "two pure actstt is a 
contradiction. 
All of these attributes have been rationally deduced from 
the notion "first im.>';l.Obile mover." Hence, to deny that by the 
sole force of reason man ca12 attain to a knowledge of the 
existence of God is not only to show ignorance of the Thomsiti 
argmaents, but to deny a fact evident to all men from the very 
r 
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begin;:-~ing3 of philosophic enquiry. 
Finally, one word about the Prime Mover of Aristotle and 
St. Thomas. Most of the modern critics of t:'1e traditional 
argu.r.1en ts for the existence of God, Haldane among them, 
identify the proofs of the pagan and the saint. This seems to 
be true if one reads only the SULuna Contra Gentiles. But the 
Summa Theologica contains St. Thomas' fully developed views 
on the subject, and in them is seen how far apart are the 
notions of the Prime Mover of the two philosophers. True 
enough the cosmography of both is the same, but, underneath 
the physical analogy, what a metaphysical differencet Aris-
totle eqaates the Prime Mover with local motion; St. Thomas 
transports Him to the realn of Being. Then, too, what a 
difference in the notion of Godl 
Lorsqll'on lit, dans les commentaires de la 
Divine Come die, que le denier; vers du grande poeme 
ne .fa1t que trac1uire la pensee d'Aristote, on est 
bien loin de compte, car l 1 ar.1or che muove il Sole e 
l'altre stelle n 1 a de comnun que 1e nom avec re--
premier moteur immobile. Le Dieu de Saint Thomas 
et de Dante est un Dieu qui aime, celui d 1Aristote 
est un Dieu qui se laisse aimcr; 1 1 araour qui meut 
le ciel et les astres chez Aristote est l'amour du 
ciel e=:t des astres pour Dieu, au lieu que celui 
qt:.i les 111eut chez Saint Thomas et Dante est l'amour 
de Dieu pour le monde; entl:'e les deu.x causes motrices , , 
il y a toute la difference qui separe la cause 
finale de la cause efficiente. Et l'on doit aller 
encore plus loin.8 
Reru.:m Deus tenax vigor 
Immotus in te permanens. 
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